It could have been a part of a possible solution to prevent a collapse of the European monetary system – the eurobonds. But as pointed out in numerous articles here at EconoTwist’s, it is not possible for the euro zone governments to agree on anything fundamental as long as there’s no real union of Europe. Some of you may be familiar with the term “Tragedy of the Commons” – the story about the eurobonds turns out to be yet another illustration of this human imperfection.
“Eurobonds are an appealing concept in theory, but cannot be implemented in today’s Europe characterized by a large debt overhang, and the absence of a credible system to enforce even the weak elements of economic governance we have now.”
“The current upheaval in financial markets has reinforced the voice of those who call for the introduction of Eurobonds as the only way to end the euro debt crisis. However, August 2011 might well be remembered as the month during which the idea of eurobonds was murdered by the Italian political system,” Director of the think tank CEPS in Brussels, Daniel Gros, writes in commentary article at www.eurointelligence.com.
Well, if the Italians didn’t do it, somebody else would have…
The idea of introducing a new financial instrument – another way to issue more sovereign debt – might have provided the European banks with another temporary source of income.
But that’s about it…
Besides, the practical issues related to an implementation of such bonds is not possible to solve in today’s political environment in Europe.
Maybe the eurobonds belongs to the future. But for now it’s just another nice thought – much like the very basic idea of the “United States of Europe“.
The basic facts of the Italian drama are well-known: in early August, when interest rates on Italian government debt soared and the Italian banking system got under pressure, the ECB started buying Italian debt on the understanding that Italy would quickly adopt a multiannual program to reduce its deficit and promote growth.
This understanding was made explicit in a letter send by the present and future presidents of the ECB to the Italian government.
Initially it appeared the country would react in a matter of days.
But as the pressure from financial markets abated somewhat the government, under pressure from different parts of the ruling coalition, continued to change its mind on what taxes to increase and what expenditure to cut.
Growth enhancing measures went out of the window and the revenues assumptions underpinning the budgets plans became ever more shaky.
The ECB had thus little choice, but to stop buying Italian bonds, whose yields then soared again.
This finally convinced the Government that it had no choice but to toughen the budget again so as to ensure renewed support by the ECB.
Given this experience it is instructive to speculate what might have happened if Eurobonds had already been implemented by early 2011.
Imagine first, that Italy could still have issued substantial amounts of Eurobonds.
In this case the Italian government would have continued to defend its position that Italy’s fundament position was sound (relatively low deficit and strong domestic savings); and that there was therefore no need to implement a strong fiscal adjustment now.
There are always valid arguments to delay action.
The Italian government might even find a Nobel prize laureate who would support the notion that any attempt to implement a fiscal adjustment now would be self-defeating because it would depress demand so much that in the end the deficit would not improve.
Defenders of Eurobonds would say that ‘the EU’ (i.e. the eurogroup of finance ministers) might have imposed the adjustment anyway.
This is possible, but not likely, because in the absence of a clear market signal the need for action can always be disputed.
But what would have happened even if “the EU” had ordered Italy to do a fiscal adjustment now?
It is quite possible that the government might not have been able to find a majority in Parliament.
What if Italy had already exhausted its allocation of Eurobonds (or the EU had not allowed it to issue any more)?
In this case the price of all the Italian “non eurobonds,” i.e. those Italian bonds not guaranteed by its partners, would have tanked even more as financial markets would perceive that these bonds would be first in line in case of trouble.
Total Italian government debt is about 1.800 billion euro. If one assumes that eurobonds might have been issued for about one half of this one would still be left with 900 billion euro, enough to drive large parts of the EU’s banking system into insolvency should the country default on it.
With or without Eurobonds, the ECB would have faced the same unpleasant choice: intervene in the secondary market or risk a collapse of the European banking system.
The Italian “summer theatre” of 2011 illustrates once more that the problem is not that a government will openly defy its euro zone partners, but rather that its parliament is so divided that the government cannot push through the measures that are required.
Greece has already shown that countries default not because they deliberately choose to, but because society at large is so divided that it is impossible to make the necessary adjustment to ensure orderly debt service.
This leads to the final thought: What would happen to the “eurobonds” issued by a country which does not comply with conditions set in Brussels or Frankfurt?
Would financial markets really believe that Germany would honour its guarantee if the country concerned had not abided by its own obligations?
The German government might well argue that the country had destroyed the essential elements (‘Geschäftsgrundlage’ in German) for eurobonds.
Depending on the exact legal basis for Eurobonds, i.e. what jurisdiction would apply, this uncertainly could very well lead to significant yield differentials between the Eurobonds issued by different member states.
Eurobonds are an appealing concept in theory, but cannot be implemented in today’s Europe characterized by a large debt overhang, and the absence of a credible system to enforce even the weak elements of economic governance we have now.
So, the confusion continues…
Related by the EconoTwist’s:
- The Big Cannoli (Europe’s Catch 22)
- Merkel And Sarkozy Propose New European Economic Government
- German Proposal for European “Budget Police”
- Poland Goes South?
- Kenneth Rogoff: Some European Countries Are Fundamentally Bankrupt
- “European Leaders Have Failed”
- EU Leaders Clueless As Borrowing Costs Soars
- The Negative Feedback Loop
- Wolfgang Munchau: This Is a Political Crisis
- The Absurdity of the French-German Euro Summit
- The Big Bailout Scam (EU Version)
- IMF Director Christine Lagarde Sees “Crisis of Confidence”
- Greek Debt is Out of Control, Report Says
- The Sociopathic Banking System of Europe
- Europe: “Time to Get Angry”
- EU: No Bail In, Just Eternal Bailouts
Other related articles:
- EU’s ultimatum to Germany: act now to save the euro (independent.co.uk)
- Insight from Mish: Stocks Rally on Dead-on-Arrival Eurobond Proposals, Rumors, and Patches; More ECB Emergency Funding; Why a Breakup of the Eurozone is Likely (jhaines6.wordpress.com)
- Forex Live US Wrap: Eurobonds Trump Retail Sales (forexlive.com)
- How Eurobonds Could “Work” (businessinsider.com)
- S&P Warns That Eurobonds, As Envisaged, Could Get Junk Rating (forexlive.com)
- Portugal PM: Eurobonds No Solution; Will Meet Targets: Press (forexlive.com)
- Here’s Why Eurobonds Won’t Work (project-syndicate.org)
- China Premier Wen Jiabao Dampens Speculation on China Saving Europe with Statement “Debt-Laden Economies Must First Put Their Own Houses in Order” (jhaines6.wordpress.com)
- EU Commission ready to announce eurobond proposal | euronews, world news (lucas2012infos.wordpress.com)