It’s the financial service web site FierceFinance.com who have put together the list of the biggest blunders in the industry during the past year. Personally, I might have put a few other issues on the list, but when it comes to the final top position I think we have a winner:
“Led by CEO Jon Corzine, formerly of Goldman Sachs, MF Global was a trading powerhouse back in 2010. That all came crashing down in late 2011, as the bank filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and lost track of $600 million in capital.”
FierceFinance
Yeah, losing $600 million is probably harder than earning them, and quite an achievement…
FireceFinance writes:
“The MF Global failure was a total unraveling involving poor management and risky investment. For what it’s worth, Corzine said he will not be seeking to collect his $12 million Golden Parachute severance package. But reports surfaced in The Telegraph speculating that MF Global employees in the U.K. may have received Q3 corporate bonuses, even with the firm on the brink of failure.”
Read more: MF Global coverage.
Here’e the rest of the list:
2. Bank of America imposes debit card fee.
“The backlash against the bank was severe. But CEO Brian Moynihan defended the bank’s right to make a profit, saying in a statement that he had “an inherent duty as a CEO of a publicly owned company to get a return for my shareholders.”
3. Frustration sparks Occupy Wall Street protests.
“What originated as peaceful has become violent, as reports surfaced of police using tear gas on protestors along with attempts to force them out of encampments.”
4. S&P downgrades US credit rating.
“Even though S&P went on to be criticized for its debt rating practices (the issue of credit rating agency credibility looms large), the move was significant at a time when budget showdowns in Washington and a stagnant economy were constantly in the headlines.”
5. Raj Rajaratnam slammed for insider trading.
“The convicted insider trader dominated the news in 2011 and in many ways is seen as the pinnacle of success for federal prosecutors, who have been cracking down on offenders.”
6. Citi stumbles after major data breach.
“Citi was reluctant to publicly announce the breach, finally doing so only after being pressed on the subject by the media. Citi offered a public explanation of the incident and tried reassuring customers that the stolen data was insufficient to commit fraud and that social security numbers, dates of birth and card security codes remained secure.”
7. Bank of America forecloses on couple.
“One of the more bizarre stories of 2011 was when Bank of America accidentally foreclosed on a Florida couple. Although the bank eventually backed down, the couple hired a lawyer to recoup attorney’s fees. Five months passed without payment–this coming after a judge ordered the bank to pay up. So the couple and its attorney showed up to foreclose on a local Bank of America branch, declaring their intent to remove furniture, cash and other property.”
8. RSA suffers cyber attack.
“RSA’s SecureID tokens are used by 30,000 organizations worldwide. RSA remained open about the attack, offering tips and posting details describing the anatomy of the breach. But even transparency didn’t reverse the fact that banks were forced to rethink security and look for new options.”
9. Typo costs Goldman Sachs $45 million.
“A tip for everyone who deals with contracts: Double check all calculations. Goldman Sachs learned that lesson the hard way back in June when it issued four warrants relating to Japan’s Nikkei index. Buried in the depths of financial jargon was a serious formulaic mistake: A multiplication sign was inserted where there should have been a divide by sign.”
10. John Paulson‘s Sino-Forest bust.
“In all likelihood, 2011 will not be a great year for hedge fund manager John Paulson. Among his failures was selling 35 million shares of the Chinese company Sino-Forest at an estimated loss of $500 million.”
Original post here.
Related:
- MF Global’s collapse looks like a scandal (blogs.ft.com)
- Missing MF Global Funds Could Top $1.2B, Trustee Says (foxnews.com)
- MF Global: The mess that keeps getting messier (finance.fortune.cnn.com)
- DealBook: British Regulators Bar Hedge Fund Executive From Industry (dealbook.nytimes.com)
- MF Global: Fraud, Incompetence, or a Bit of Both? (dailyfinance.com)
- House panel calls Corzine to testify (marketwatch.com)
- Analysis of the U.S. Savings and Loans Banking Market (prnewswire.com)
- Which? Sting Shows Banks ‘Give Bad Advice’ (news.sky.com)





































Roubini and the Nonsens of Voluntary Bail-ins
There’s plenty of nonsense circulating on the subject of dealing with the European debt crisis. Professor Nouriel Roubini takes a shot at one of the latest genius ideas – an “induced voluntary bail-in” of the Greek bank’s creditors… Now, don’t ask me how that is supposed to work….
“Trying to apply something that was originally designed to bail-in cross-border short-term interbank lines among banks to the bonded debt of a sovereign is a big fudge.”
Nouriel Roubini
“Now that the ECB has, for the time being, effectively vetoed any bail-in of Greece’s creditors, even a modest profiling of the debt, the official sector is running out of options for a meaningful bail-in of creditors.”
The following article is written by Professor Nouriel Roubini and syndicated by eurointelligence.com:
The latest idea — apparently deemed acceptable even by the ECB — is a “voluntary” maintenance of the exposure of Greece’s bank creditors by inducing them to hold their exposure to the sovereign once their bond claims mature by rolling over their maturing bonds into new bonds.
This option has been compared to the Vienna Initiative, which induced the cross-border exposure of foreign banks to the central and east European banking system during the 2008-09 global crisis, when a number of sovereigns and banking systems in that region were at risk of rolling off the claims of foreign creditors.
However, the idea of bailing-in cross-border exposure to the banking system of a country under financial pressure has a longer history and includes similar bail-ins of foreign banks’ cross-border exposures to local banks in 1998 in South Korea, in 1999-2000 in Brazil and in 2001-02 in Turkey.
The more successful experiences were the more coercive ones or when it was in the banks’ interest to maintain their exposures to their foreign affiliates.
A purely voluntary maintenance of exposure at current market rates would make the sovereign’s debt even more unsustainable and, in time, will ensure a default on the new bonds.
The only way to prevent the coupon/yield on the new bonds from being close to market rates and thus unsustainable would be to provide the new bonds with seniority or some collateral; but both options are undesirable as a rollover is not a case of “debtor-in-possession” financing and thus doesn’t justify such credit sweeteners.
Also, banks alone would be bailed in — inducing massive inequality among creditors — and only maturing bonds would be sequentially rolled over as they mature, rather than a significant part of the debt being subject to a uniform debt exchange at a single point in time.
Only the latter provides meaningful debt relief for the debtor. Thus, there would be little debt relief and consequently the unsustainability of the debt burden of the sovereign would remain unresolved.
There is also significant risk of arbitrage as banks pass their exposure to Greek debt to hedge funds and other mark-to-market investors who will not be bailed in. Thus, the entire scheme risks to unravel if such arbitrage were to occur.
A debt exchange avoids this problem by roping in all creditors, not just a sub-set.
Only an orderly and market-oriented, but partially coercive, debt exchange could restore debt sustainability while avoiding contagion; a purely voluntary approach would make the debt even more unsustainable — and would risk eventually triggering a disorderly workout — if the rollover occurs at market rates that price in massive default probabilities.
An application of the Vienna Initiative to the issue of Greek public debt is also totally unrealistic.
If it is done properly, it is no different from the sort of clean debt exchange that the ECB and others abhor; and if it is done on a “voluntary” basis, it creates an even bigger and more unsustainable debt monster for the sovereign.
As in the case of Argentina, which attempted a voluntary mega debt exchange at unsustainable market yields—it would ensure that a disorderly default will occur in 2012 or 2013. Thus, claiming that one can apply a voluntary Vienna Initiative to the case of Greece is just a continuation of the big fudge and delusional kicking of the can down the road that the ECB and the official sector has indulged in for over a year now in Greece.
Yet, they also claim to support for “voluntary” approaches.
The latter are highly contrived and counterproductive if not outright destructive of the debt sustainability that everyone is trying to restore in distressed sovereigns.
By Nouriel Roubini
Nouriel Roubini is chairman of Roubini Global Economics, and professor of economics at the Stern School of Business NYU.
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